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For the psychological sciences cultural processes have traditionally served as but a
single entry into a considerable list of "phenomena under study." Until recent
years, such study has not been richly realized. There are many reasons for the
secondary role of a culturally focused psychology. Most prominently, there are
two chief ways in which culture figures in the logic of psychological science, and
neither of these favors a major professional investment. If one views cultures in
terms of a field of differences, then culture largely serves the same scientific role
as the study of personality, that is, as a moderator or qualifier for theoretical
propositions of a more general scope. Thus, the vigorous scientist will propose a
general theory (potentially true for all human organisms) of learning, motivation,
memory, perception or the like, in which case cultural variations serve only to
qualify the character of the process in varying contexts. Typically, because of the
greater scientific stakes in documenting the general as opposed to the particular,
cultural variations are either de-emphasized or simply bracketed for "later study."
In the second mode of study, culture furnishes the proving ground for the
universality of the general theory. Thus, for example, a host of investigators has
sought to demonstrate the universality of emotional categories. On this model,
culture itself is of secondary interest; cultural distinctiveness is but an impediment
to achieving the broader goal of research.
Although a sturdy and expanding band of psychologists have nevertheless
generated volumes of research on cultural universals and variations (see for
example, Berry et. al, 1992; Triandis and Berry, 1980), others have begun to
explore the limits to the traditional view of psychology and culture. For example,
some are drawn to a vision of a culturally sensitive psychology as a site for the
study of the relationship between universal process and cultural rule systems (see
for example, Eckensberger, 1994). Others see the primary task of the culturally
concerned psychologist as elucidating processes of interculturation - how cultures
conflict and reconfigure through interaction (see, for example, Denoux, 1992).
Still others see the primary challenge as more practical in character. Rather than
working toward abstract theoretical formulations, the culturally engaged
psychologist might help to appraise various problems of health, environment,
industrial development and the like in terms of the values, beliefs and motives
particular to the culture at hand (see, for example, Moghaddam, 1987; Pandey,
1988). Such efforts are useful in exploring the possibilities for a unique role for
cross-cultural psychology, and draw special attention to the needs for more

interpretive and more practical orientations to the research process.
Interestingly, these deliberations on alternatives have not grown primarily out of
North American soil. As many see it, they reflect the misgivings of myriad
scholars in non-American, non-Western, and/or Third World locales, and
particularly their doubts about the implicit presumption that 1) there is a
universally acceptable conception of psychological science, and/or 2) all cultures
should emulate psychology as practiced in North America. Such discontent has
become increasingly vocal in recent years. For example, Sinha (1990) has
questioned the predominance of "vertical collaboration," that is, of psychologists
from developing countries working on research initiated by investigators in
developed nations; he proposes "horizontal collaboration" among researchers
working on practical problems across various regions of a country or with those in
other developing nations. Moghaddam (1987) has outlined the attempt of many
European psychologists to develop a psychology that is distinctively rooted in
European culture. Kagitcibasi (1986) has pointed to the way in which Western
individualism has important biasing effects on social psychological theory. Misra
and Gergen (1993) have explored important limitations of North American
theories and research practices when imported into the Indian cultural context.
In the expression of such doubts, the profession of psychology is relatively
conservative. As a contrast, in cultural anthropology there is enormous concern
over the tendency of western anthropology to construct other cultures in terms
saturated with western ideals and preconceptions, to exploit other cultures by
using them for ends that are solely tied to local western interests, and colonizing
other cultures through the exportation of western ideas, values and practices (see
for example, Clifford, 1988; Fabian, 1983; Marcus, 1986). Similar discontents are
manifest in various geographical area studies. For example, in his now classic
work, Orientalism, Said (1978) proposes that research in "Oriental Studies"
reflects the presumption of western superiority, and operates as a self-serving
projection of the investigators'conceptions.
There is much to be said for healthy dissent, and reflexive deliberation on the
taken-for-granted assumptions of the profession. However, perhaps the most
important test of the critical impulse is in terms of its capacity to generate
alternative courses of action, to enrich the discipline and the world it serves in
important ways. It is to this end that we direct the remainder of this offering.
For many of us there is no more dramatic form of critical reflection than that
stemming from an inversion of psychology's traditional subject-object dichotomy.
That is, rather than privileging the psychologist as the scrutinizing subject for
whom culture serves as the object of study, we find it most fully liberating to
place culture in the vanguard. Let us begin with culture, as variously lived by each
of us, and place psychology under scrutiny. In this case we may ask, in what
degree and with what effects is psychological science itself a cultural
manifestation? Beginning in this way, it is immediately apparent that the science
is largely a byproduct of the western cultural tradition at a particular time in its

historical development. Suppositions about the nature of knowledge, the character
of objectivity, the place of value in the knowledge generating process, and the
nature of linguistic representation, for example, all carry the stamp of a unique
cultural tradition. Most interestingly, the character of psychological science is
informed by a priori suppositions concerning the nature of human psychology
itself (Gergen, 1994). That is, the science is based on certain assumptions
concerning the psychological functioning of the individual scientist; without these
assumptions the science as we know it would fail to be intelligible. It is presumed,
for example, that the scientist possesses a conscious or observing mind, capable of
reflecting and recording the nature of a world external to it; that the scientist
possesses powers of inductive and deductive logic; and that the scientist also
harbors motives and values that, without safeguards, can obscure observation and
interfere with logical processes. All of these grounding assumptions are
constituents of a western ethnopsychology (see Heelas and Lock, 1981).
In what follows we wish to give fuller voice to specific cultural standpoints.
Speaking from disparate cultural backgrounds and disparate histories of culturally
sensitive study, we explore a range of problems provoked by the presumption of a
universal science of psychology. However, rather than resting secure in critique,
we also begin to explore the benefits for psychology when culture is given
primacy.
Toward Indigenous Indian Psychology (Girishwar Misra)
The discipline of psychology as practiced in India is primarily based on the
knowledge and know-how imported from the Euro-American tradition within the
context of the more general exportation of Western knowledge and education (D.
Sinha, 1986). As such Indian psychology began its journey by imitating the
research problems, concepts, theories and methods borrowed from the research
done in western countries. Being the recipient, it was subordinated to the donor
country. The colonial condition of India led to gross neglect and avoidance of the
Indian intellectual and cultural tradition central to the practices of the Indian
people. The academic world maintained a distance from its cultural heritage and
looked down at it with suspicion. The colonial incursion was so powerful that
while western concepts were accepted and welcomed without scrutiny, indigenous
concepts were denied entry to the academic discourse. Since the discipline was
imitative, its growth remained always one step behind the developments in the
donor country.
Unlike the West, psychology in India did not grow as an integral part of the
evolutionary process. Training by British or American psychologists coupled with
the colonial influence produced a strong tendency in the academy to engage in a
practice of culture blind psychology. Surprisingly enough this did not create
discontent, as researchers were generally confident that they were contributing to
the cumulatively growing pool of universal knowledge. Thus, deviations were
treated as errors and the problems and issues were filtered through the scientific

framework (Nandy, 1974)
For a long period, psychology taught in the Indian universities was pure western
psychology and attempts were made to safeguard it from the contaminating effects
of Indian culture and thought. Its teaching maintained a strong universalistic
stance. The research studied largely focused on testing the adequacy of western
theories and concepts, wherein subjects provided objective behavioral data. In this
scheme of scientific activity, culture was an irrelevant and extraneous intrusion.
The current western thinking of the science of psychology in its prototypical form,
despite being local and indigenous, assumed a global relevance, and was treated as
a universal or pan-human mode of generating knowledge. Its dominant voice
subscribes to a decontextualized vision with an extraordinary emphasis on
individualism, mechanism, and objectivity.
This peculiarly western mode of thinking is fabricated, projected and
institutionalized through representational technologies and scientistic rituals, and
transported on a large scale to the non-Western societies under politico-economic
domination. As a result, western psychology tends to maintain an independent
stance at the cost of ignoring other substantive possibilities from disparate cultural
traditions. Mapping reality through Western constructs has offered a pseudo
understanding of the peoples of alien cultures and has had debilitating effects in
terms of misconstruing the special realities of other peoples, and exoticizing or
disregarding psychologies that are non-Western. Consequently, when people from
other cultures are exposed to western psychology they find their identities placed
in question, and their conceptual repertoires rendered obsolete.
For many of us, the universally projected modernist view of the individual as a
self-determining and self-contained being is rapidly losing its functional value. In
particular, post-modern conditions of massive cultural interchange invite us to
think in terms of global coordination and cooperation. Sampson (1989) proposes
that the western theory of the person has to be revised. To this end he proposes
that the community not only describes a person's identity but constitutes it. In this
framework persons are viewed as guardians of culturally based assets, and not
their owners. Concomitantly, there is a resurgence of interest in approaching
human action through more local modes of understanding, and issues of
subjectivity, interpretation, and everyday understanding become increasingly
salient. This shift signals the possibility of developing more culturally grounded
and locally useful forms of knowledge. It goes beyond the positivist position and
proposes that the knowledge claims in the human domain are relative to the
setting in which they are developed.
From this standpoint, we may see the person and the cultural context as mutually
defining. Instead of searching for simple cause-effect relationships, a contextdependent strategy is more desirable. The role of the academic psychologist might
be better envisioned in terms of understanding, reading and interpreting cultural
actions; sensitizing people to the potentialities of action within the existing range

of intelligibilities; and inviting exploration into alternative forms of
understanding. Innovative reconstructions of the academic toolbox are required;
forms of language require attention, not as representations of underlying mental
mechanisms but as culturally constituting actions. We must expand not only the
repertoire of our analytical tools, but also add new dimensions to the theoretical
and conceptual arena of the discipline. This also means active interchange with
allied disciplines. This kind of participatory practice would be creative and
emancipatory, acting so as to enrich and extend the cultural traditions.
There are numerous signs of movement toward indigenous forms of psychology.
At a metatheoretical level, Pranjpe (1984) has explored the possibility of relating
and contrasting eastern and western concepts of self, identity and consciousness.
Varma (in press) has approached the possibility of developing a social
constructionist framework for psychology in India. Misra and Gergen (1993) have
explored the possibility of articulating Indian (Hindu) construals of psychological
functioning, with special emphasis on the spiritual and natural roots of the
ontology of personhood. An indigenous psychology, from this standpoint, would
emphasize: a holistic-organic worldview, coherence and order across all life
forms, the socially constituted/embedded nature of the person, non-linear growth
and continuity in life, behavior as transaction, the temporal and atemporal
existence of human beings, spatio-temporally contextualized action, the search for
eternity in life, the desirability of self-discipline, the transitory nature of human
experience, distributed rather than personalized control, and a belief in multiple
worlds (material and spiritual).
In more pointed analyses, there has been increased questioning of western
psychological constructs and methods for explicating and understanding Indian
reality. These efforts to offer alternative construals have taken various forms,
including theoretical and methodological innovations in social psychological,
clinical and organizational contexts. A fruitful interface between indigenous
Indian thought and psychological discourse is found in the Guru Chela paradigm
of therapy (Neki, 1973), the nurturant task style of leadership (J.B.P. Sinha,1980),
analyses of self and personality (Naidu, 1994; Tipathi, 1988), the
reconceptualization of achievement (Misra and Agarwal, 1985: Dalai, Singh, and
Misra, 1988), analyses of the Indian psyche (Kakar, 1978), emotion (Jain, 1994),
justice (Krishnan, 1992), morality (Misra, 1991), the concept of well-being
(D.Sinha, 1990), development (Kaur and Sarawsathi, 1992), values (Prakash,
1994), detachment (N. Pande and Naidu, 1992), and methods of organizational
intervention (Chakraporty, 1985). As Marriott (1992) has envisioned, these
developments suggest,"that alternative social sciences are potentially available in
the materials of many non-western cultures, and their development is essential to
serve in the many places now either left to ad hoc descriptions or badly
monopolized by social sciences borrowed from the West." (p.269)
This move toward an indigenous Indian psychology does not imply an
abandonment of the western tradition. The aim is not to generate a set of mutually

exclusive, culturally based orientations that fail to regard or appreciate the
alternatives; rather, there is an additional need to generate orientations that
intersect and interpenetrate. Even three decades ago, Sinha (1962) indicated a
need for an integration of modern psychology with Indian thought. Indian scholars
have been drawn to this possibility by attempting to mix western and Indian
concepts and to adapt western concepts to suit Indian culture. Whether western
scholars can join in such a multi-world endeavor, so that a true dialogue ensues,
remains to be seen.
Psychology in the Maori Context (Andrew Lock)
The practice of psychology in New Zealand, and particularly within the Maori
context, cannot be understood without some grasp of history. The Maori are an
indigenous people whose origins in the country can perhaps be traced back some
3,000 years. A second group of people began to arrive some 300 years ago, and
have sustained a post-Renaissance Indo-European culture that is generically
termed "British." Largely because of their superior force of arms, and through a
series of dubious political "agreements," the British gradually asserted their rule of
the territories. Simultaneously, the Maori people have found themselves the
victims of wide-ranging abuses, in which they have lost land, the rights to many of
their traditional practices, and governance rights which they felt had been
guaranteed by earlier agreements. They have increasingly been subjected to laws
and regulations that either disregarded or actively interfered with traditions of
longstanding.
It has only been within the past few decades that a significant political force has
been mounted in opposition to these incursions. Historically, there is no single
Maori culture, as a recognizable, coherent unit; rather, there are many distinctive
tribes each with its own local customs. However, largely for political purposes a
vociferous "Maori" voice was developed to challenge the ever-encroaching British
reign. Only in 1987 did the Maori language become an official language of State.
State agencies have since developed mission statements in which they have
committed themselves to observing certain Maori rights and customs. Yet, the
nature of their policies is still very much an unknown; all cultural institutions are
going through a process of re-inventing themselves.
What are the implications of the above sketch for the contemporary practice of
psychological science? Consider the reaction of Lawson-Te Aho (1993):
psychology, and clinical psychology in particular, has created the mass
abnormalization of Maori people by virtue of the fact that Maori people have been
on the receiving end of psychological practice as the helpless recipients of
(English) defined labels and treatments... Clinical psychology is a form of social
control derived from human intent and human action and offers no more "truth"
about the realities of Maori people's lives than a regular reading of the horoscope
page in the local newspaper.(p.26)
In effect, because psychology is seen by the Maori as an instrument devised by the

dominant power, the profession is practiced in a highly politicized environment.
There are three important consequences. First, because western psychology
provides the instruments of assessment on which judgements are made, it is
distrusted implicitly as a force in the continuation of suppression. Durie (l994)
notes that Maori psychiatric admission rates are two or three times those of nonMaori, and that there are no simple explanations for this. None-the-less the
westerm diagnostic scales can be socially represented, grasped, and characterized
by the Maori as part of the policing mechanisms of a post-colonial state.
Second, recent developments in social psychology in the area of discourse and
"social construction" have been seized on as of central importance for a practical
contribution from the discipline (Potter and Wetherell, l987; Wetherell and Potter,
l992). Discourse studies are seen as having strong potential for undermining the
authority of the elites (Huygens, l993); studies of the discourse of the oppressed
hold promise for challenging existing social relations (Essed, l988). Smith (l992),
for example, outlines Maori discursive ideologies of education and language that
have undergirded changes in the educational system; knowledge of the discourse
of the disempowered brings it into contrasting relief with the discourse of the
empowered and thereby both poses and enables a challenge to the status quo.
Third, the politicized context of psychology serves to highlight the constructed
nature of social life and institutions, such that in the hands of skilled workers, new
and effective forms of practice can be established. Examples include the "Just
Therapy" of Charles Waldegrave's group in Wellington (E.G.Waldegrave and
Tapping, 1990) and David Epston's contribution to the development of "narrative
therapy" (e.g., White and Epston, l990).
In my view, the political polarization of the discipline is not merely derived from
local relations of dominance and submission, but involves a clash of cultures.
There is, here, a clash of values, of logics, and of conceived worlds and
personhood; it is a difference in linguistic and other practices with
incommensurate historical roots. "Personhood" in the two cultures cannot properly
be equated. Superficially we might locate similarities, for example, in the
conception of the mind-body relation, between the tinana and wairua. But these
latter words are embedded in a complex web of cultural practices, and the direct
translation of tinana as body, and wairua as mind, cannot be substantiated. The
"map of the self" is different in each culture, and each culture could be said to
require its own separate "psychological science."
I have found coming to terms with this conclusion very difficult. In this case, the
academic psychology of experimentation and measurement is not being
challenged on epistemological grounds, nor on its constitution and interpretation
of its data - its "truth status," if you like. These could be interesting discussions.
Rather, academic and applied psychology are just deemed irrelevant. Why would
a Maori want to measure intelligence, or sanity, for example? Western schools and
western asylums are not the Maori way of education nor treatment for the

troubled. As I confront this fact, great doubt suddenly opens up. At one time - not
so long ago - western cultural institutions did not require such measures. What,
after all, is the status of the measurements created by such scales? Intelligence as a
concept has no purchase on an objective reality; it does not map anything in the
"real" natural world: rather the concept of intelligence seems historically
constituted to meet the challenges faced by western institutions in gaining control
of their constituents (see, for example, Rose, 1990). These thoughts have been
raised before, but as philosophical and social critiques grounded in a shared
tradition of thought, rather than directly by a cultural tradition that defines a livedin human reality in which these "things" are irrelevant except as instruments of
politically motivated suppression.
If it is to have a future here, psychology has to be practical within its cultural
context. This is not to say that the western tradition has nothing to offer. There
are, for one, some approaches within contemporary western psychology that have
simple instrumental utility. To appeal to an impeccable study such as Dan Slobin's
Cross Linguistic Developmental Project (1985-1992) increases the chances of
gaining funding for setting up Maori Language and Cultural Schools; it is highstatus research, and thus appeals to the governments of New Zealand. One could
also teach developmental psychology, but because of its practical implications,
more usefully from a Vygotskian perspective than a Piagetian one. In particular,
the former admits the constitutive role of culture as an integral part of
development rather than a background variable. One could teach social
psychology as practical rhetoric, but as little else, for experimental social
psychology is recognized by many scholars as a branch of an ideologically
imbued system of thinking, value saturated, and imperialistic in ambitions. The
"narrative" tradition is currently the most attractive candidate for the survival of
(near) mainstream academic psychology (Sarbin, 1984). How to tell one's story
effectively is a pressing problem in this country, not only in terms of sustaining
prideful traditions but in the generation of a "level playing field." Further, such
racial discourses also contribute importantly to a substantial data base in social
psychology (as contained, for example, in the journal, Discourse and Society).
Discourse studies are seen as committed to expressing the worlds of the unvoiced
peoples.
In part, the challenge of becoming a psychologist in New Zealand came from
previous work, in which Paul Heelas and I, as editors, outlined a universal model
of beliefs about the mind (Heelas and Lock, 1981). In one chapter of this volume,
Jean Smith (1981) wrote on an exotic culture, the Maori, in which being a self was
differently conceived. We as editors, however, felt the Maori view was
"encompassable" within our science. We conceived of a universal "moral science"
in which agents were aware of the responsibilities which their cultural categories
constructed for them. This model may still have some validity. However, the
challenge has turned out to be the validity of that validity, the morality of my
morality, and the human use of my science. Once cannot simply do as George
Miller once advocated - give psychology away - when the gift is an imposition,

seen as an element in a policing process that denies the validity of a culture to
determine its own ends.
Bridge Over Troubled Waters: A Turkish Vision (Aydan Gulerce)
In parallel to the global transformations taking place, psychology in Turkey is
rapidly "developing." In large measure the profession has been following
(sometimes blindly) the footsteps of so-called western (mainly American)
psychology - with considerable delay. Ironically, it is not the strategies for
defining the place of psychology in society and improving its prestige, that have
been transported, so much as psychological technology and theoretical concepts.
In spite of this generally unfortunate condition, a substantial number of pioneer
psychologists in Turkey are transforming the psychological know-how acquired in
western educational insitutions in order to meet the specific needs of the present
sociocultural context. They have made substantial efforts to "think globally, act
locally," recognizing the possibility of modernization without obliterating the
local culture (see, for example, Kagitcibasi, 1986)
At the same time, it would not be so difficult to conclude that American
psychology has largely been "thinking locally, acting globally." The reader
interested in the potentially damaging impact of western psychology in developing
countries can consult with numerous writings by cross-cultural psychologists,
including one in the Turkish context (Kagitcibasi, 1984), and a special issue of the
International Journal of Psychology devoted to this topic (Sinha and Holtzman,
l984). Much has already been written about the value-ladeness and other selfinduced constraints of contemporary psychological science. Not surprisingly,
there are also many examples in which American psychology seems all too
parochial when contrasted to the enduring characteristics of Turkish tradition (cf.
Kagitcibasi, 1982; Oner, 1982). In my own inquiry into ethnopsychological
conceptualizations of mental health (Gulerce, l990), child development (Gulerce,
l992), and the family (Gulerce, l992), for example, evidence was provided for
traditional moral, religious, and sociocultural values that differed or clashed with
those implicit in American psychology (when checked against DSM-III,
developmental psychology and contemporary family models). There was also
evidence for the diffusion of a western ideology of individualism and related
construals, indirectly (via cultural artifacts like media) or directly through
psychological theories and practices (such as "assertiveness training"), in this
socioculturally rich and dynamic society.
To me, any attempt to "repair" or "replace" the western tradition, prior to
considering its philosophical and methodological assumptions, along with its
place in a world of practical affairs, would largely be useless. To be sure, crosscultural psychologists were quick to notice cultural "shortsightedness" of western
psychology (see, for example, Berry, l990; Seagal et al, l990). In general,
however, they have been unable to abandon mainstream scientism in general,
remaining loyal to empiricism, and testing western theories with "culturally"

(geographically) diverse data. In a similar vein, Turkish psychologists have been
concerned particularly with the cultural/ecological validity of various research and
application tools (see, for example Oner, l994; Savisir and Sahin, l985). Enormous
energy has been invested in the adaptation and normalizing of western
instruments. Clearly, the importation of measures, concepts and hypotheses
involves a mutually supportive relationship with the diffusion of positivistempiricist conceptions of science. It is also unclear what injustice is done to local
intelligibilities by the importation of western conceptions. When psychological
terminology is translated into Turkish, the local language loses its richness of
connotation along with its multiplicitous functioning in the society. It was not
until recently that the conceptual validity of the western models or theories behind
the technology were challenged and a "replacement" process begun (e.g., Gulerce,
l992).
It is in this respect that the indigenous psychology movement (e.g, Heelas and
Lock, l981; Kim and Berry, l993), appears to offer good potential for making the
discipline socioculturally relevant, and for constructing culturally valid and
intelligible theories. Beyond being culturally appropriate, indigenous conceptions
may in turn contribute to the revision of western theories. To illustrate the point
with works from Turkey, Kagitcibasi (l985) demonstrated that "culture of
separateness" and "culture of relatedness" appear compatible and interdependent
in our society, and hence are not mutually the exclusive polarities assumed in
western theorizing. Again, my own studies on the conceptualization of transitional
phenomena (Gulerce, l99l) and the use of traditional objects (Gulerce, l99l), argue
for the coexistent transformations towards both "individuation" and
"connectedness," contradicting not only western theory, but classical assumptions
about human development - such as unidirectionality, unilinearity, universalism,
hierarchical and progressive order, etc. Additionally, many other theoretical
assumptions relying on a view of rational, materialist, pragmatic, functionalist,
self-centered, and self-contained human being fall short in application to
understanding of much Turkish behavior. A guiding model is required which
leaves room for the irrational, spiritual, altruistic, conservative, other-centered,
community-oriented, and interdependent human being.
At the same time, I do not feel content with the incorporation of "culture" into
psychology at the level of theory alone. The indigenization of psychology still
faces important challenges. Conceptual and operational definitions of culture, for
example, are major sources of difficulty. Converting culture from "independent
variable" to "index variable," drawing regional/commmunal boundaries, relying
on group statistics - all at the expense of "private cultures" and local psychology not only has the potential danger of generating a "sense of understanding" the
other (lodged in one's local assumptions), but of creating new polarities. Further
efforts at opening psychology to diverse traditions at all levels of inquiry,
particularly in the areas of epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and praxis are much
needed.

At this point it is important to recognize that, just as there are psychologists in
Turkey who are unwittingly more "American" than the American, there are
psychologists living in the States who are also contributing importantly to the
present discussion. Various programs have developed concurrently under the
general headings of "cultural" and "cultural/historical" psychology to study
culturally constituted processes (e.g., Cole, l990, 1992; Markus and Kitayama,
l99l; Rogoff, 1990; Shweder, l990; Valsiner, 1989, 1991; Wertsch, 1991). Their
studies of human processes in cultural contexts help in understanding and
incorporating culture into psychology at a fundamental level. Similarly, we are
provided with significant philosophical and historical critiques of psychology's
strong commitments to foundationalism, empiricism, and the self-contained
individual (see, for example, Danziger, 1990; Gergen, 1994; Jahoda, 1993; Sarbin,
l989; Shotter, 1993).Such reflections help the discipline to realize its particular
historical and cultural location.
Taking advantage of my present location, looking from the bridge between East
and West, literally and metaphorically, I believe we must press further toward an
appreciation of differing philosophic traditions and in the direction of
psychology's inter-culturation. Continuous consideration of the varied
epistemological and metapsychological assumptions underlying and fertilizing
mainstream spyshcology is necessary to soften the discipline's rigid boundaries.
Equally important to me is the acceptance of novelty that enables creative growth
and increases conceptual/ecological adequacy of knolwedge and its use around the
globe (Gulerce, in press). Otherwise it is all too easy to see the situation in terms
of western producers of psychological knowledge, as against non-western
importers. Yet, in the long run this kind of dichotomous thinking is unproductive,
and again, western (Cartesian) in origin. It seems further to sustain an "us vs.
them" mentality, and thus inhibits the development of true dialogue among the
cultures (to say nothing of dialogic methodology within the field itself). It may not
only be arrogant (ironically, even in the search for solutions to "neocolonization"), but also epistemologically erroneous, to view the West
independent of the rest.
If the West has gained sufficient self-reflexivity to prevent further "patronizing,"
and the rest has gained sufficient self-assertion for "emancipation," we can hope
for genuine intercultural interchange. In my view, a strong commitment to any
particular epistemology and methodology is unproductive. It is my specific hope
that we might move together toward a discipline that would enable us to "live
together more comfortably (with)in the universe" as opposed to "gaining control
over" it. Needless to say, the capacity for diversity and pluralism, a tolerance for
ambiguity and the unknown, and an acceptance of - and peace with - limitations in
the quest for knowledge are not well developed western qualities. Alternative
philosophical positions, I believe, would help to prevent psychological science
from anxious reductionisms (as in behaviorism and cognitivism) and from
superficial and/or conceptually flawed constructions of human reality (as in
pragmatism and rationalism). Perhaps they would encourage what for the world

might be a "better" or more humane psychological science.
I am sometimes optimistic about the possibilities of inter-cultural dialogue particularly as western psychology becomes less isolated. However, it sometimes
appears that American psychologists are too busy with their own quantitative
reproductions that they cannot find time even for reading each other's work, much
less conceptually unsettling contributions from abroad. And, I fear, the enormous
production of data in the United States is seldom applicable even to local social
problems, to say nothing of the problems confronting other cultures. We see an
enormous "waste" of material and human resources, creating not knowledge but
largely irrelevant information.
In Speaking Together
Although these commentaries were generated independently, and in highly diverse
cultural contexts, we find the extent of our agreement striking. And, in spite of our
shared misgivings regarding traditional practices, we find common grounds for
what we believe could be a particularly fruitful range of inter-cultural dialogues.
For entry into such dialogue, it is first essential that no single paradigm of
psychological inquiry be granted preeminence. This is at once to honor the many
traditions of western psychology - empiricist, phenomenological, critical school,
feminist, hermeneutic, social constructionist, and more - as well as those extant in
other cultural traditions. At the same time, it is to invite a certain humility. Should
practitioners fail to appreciate the limitations necessarily inherent in their local
paradigms, and treat the alternatives as flawed inferiors, currently existing
conflicts will not give way to productive dialogue.
With dialogue configured in this way, we see the various cultures of the world
offering to each other an enormously rich array of resources. These include
multiple 1) conceptions of knowledge (metatheory), 2) discourses of human
functioning (indigenous theory), 3) culturally located descriptions of action
(research outcomes), and 4) professional practices (e.g. therapy, counseling,
meditation, mediation). In effect, the richly variegated traditions must be explored,
articulated and celebrated for the range of resources they can bring to the practice
of psychology as a global cooperative. In our view, the most positive forms of
professional interchange occur, not when one attempts to improve or englighten
the other, but when the fascinating, the novel and the practical from one context
are made available for others to appropriate selectively as their local
circumstances invite. It is to the practical means of achieving such dialogue that
attention is now required.
By placing culture in the vanguard of our concerns, we are finally drawn to the
enormous global need for a psychology of practical significance. Western
psychology has had the luxury of devoting most of its research to questions of
abstract theory, and viewing application as a second-rate derivative. However, not
only do we find such theories largely parochial (even when purporting

universality), but very little of the research has practical payoff. Expenditures on
behalf of abstract theory testing seem largely wasted. In contrast, culturally
sensitive research into people's behavior in such domains as health (e.g. trust in
medicine, safe sex), birth control, child abuse, drug addiction, ethnic and religious
conflict, and the effects of technology on society are in desparate need. This is not
to abandon abstract theory. However, in a world of extended hardship, the chief
function of such theory may be that of constructing intelligible futures. Alternative
conceptions of the person invite alternative modes of action, new institutions, and
new policies. In effect, theory becomes a practical device for constructing the
future.
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Footnote

* Requests for reprints should be sent to Dr. Kenneth Gergen, Department of
Psychology, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA. 19081, USA.
It is slowly being realized that psychological processes are rooted in historically
variable and culturally mediated practical activities. People construct multiple
socio-historically grounded realities; apprehending reality from an observerindependent perspective is not possible. A cultural emphasis underscores the
constitutive role of the social context of understanding. We as human beings
operate within socially constituted worlds. From this orientation the assumptions
of a lawful universe of human conduct and absolute objects with context-free
properties are misleading. Investigations from a culturally rooted perspective tend
to show that many western concepts lack experiential grounding in other cultures.
They offer evidence that presumed universal and identical psychological
phenomena or processes (e.g. self, emotion, morality, well-being, development)
are not viable. Instead, the character of human action is constituted differently in
varying socio-cultural contexts.
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